Putin unexpectedly gathered in Buryatia: what does China and the war have to do with it
Moscow, Siberian and Far Eastern media report on the forthcoming visit of the Kremlin leader Putin to the Republic of Buryatia temporarily controlled by the Moscow regime.
Putin rarely pleased the Buryats with his visit
If the visit takes place, it will be very interesting. Because it has a controversial context.
This is a display of the flag, which can result in a preventive half-masting of the flag before the official entry of the new overlord.
1. Putin has no good reason to visit Buryatia. For a quarter of a century of reign, the bunker leader was in Buryatia 3 times, in total – less than a day.
His last visit to this region was recorded in August 2017, that is, 5.5 years ago. Then the trip was devoted to Baikal, the release of fry and a ritual meeting with Mr. Tsidenov, who was preparing to become a governor.
That is, the subjects, already not spoiled by attention, have not seen the king live for a long time. What prompted you to go on a long journey in nasty weather?
2. Information about the preparation of Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow is circulating in the public space. Neither the Kremlin nor China confirmed such a visit until the end. Moscow needs it for insinuations on the subject of “support from Beijing.” But the Chinese leader, who recently filed for an extension of his powers, needs some kind of positive agenda for the visit. The ground for any large-scale statements from Moscow is not visible yet. Wang Yi, a high-ranking diplomat, was there recently.
Reaction to China's “peace plan” is extremely restrained. Instead of a peace plan, the main informational occasion in Russian-Chinese relations was the plot with the designation of Russian cities with Chinese names. That is, an atmosphere of some ambiguity and understatement arose.
It is not yet clear why Comrade Xi should go to the outcast without shaking hands. Why get dirty? You can send a smaller official if there is a need to demonstrate the Chinese flag in Moscow.
The life of a Buryat vs the life of a Muscovite
3. Russian troops based in Buryatia and Transbaikalia (as well as in the entire Far East) suffered heavy losses in Ukraine, having already changed 2-3 compositions. As a result, Russian defense in this region is significantly weakened. Beijing is well aware of this, which will certainly affect the tone of the discussion.
To understand scale. The total population of Buryatia and Transbaikalia is about 1 million 950 thousand people, that is, half of Kyiv. The total area is 783.2 thousand square kilometers, that is, 30% more than Ukraine. In terms of information, regions are like connected vessels.
If we take the number of killed invaders in terms of the population of the region, Buryatia shares leadership with Tyva. The “value” of a Buryat's life is about 60 times less than the value of a Muscovite. The life of a Transbaikalian is 37-40 times “cheaper” than a Muscovite.
For a region with a population of less than 1 million people, Buryatia has suffered huge losses. This has already caused a bit of a stir. These fermentations were stifled by money and repression. But the flow of coffins does not stop.
And here is the second factor. In September 2023, elections will be held in Buryatia and Transbaikalia for local “parliaments” – the People's Khural and the Legislative Assembly, respectively. If everything goes the way it is, it will not give Moscow popularity, as well as the proteges of the Kremlin in the region. They have already publicly made claims that they send their fellow tribesmen to slaughter without resistance in order to curry favor.
At the beginning of the mobilization, more or less wealthy and influential people left for neighboring Mongolia. The loyalty of the elite is so-so.
The price of a “positive agenda” in Russia may rise
Putin's visit, according to the plan, should show that the government is stronger than ever, the leader is capable, cheerful, and so on. So that the local bosses do not laugh and see whom to focus on, and the people do not talk. But the result may be the opposite. The potential difference between Moscow and Beijing is becoming too obvious.
If Putin does not bring something big and tangible, then questions will certainly arise, why is he needed at all? If this is just a signal that “I am the king here,” then in China they will smile.
The very fact of a visit to Ulan-Ude is indirect evidence that Moscow may be nervous. Therefore, they are trying to extinguish it. If the trip goes poorly, Beijing will see it best. The Kremlin will have to bend even harder, the price of a “positive agenda” will become even higher.